





**COMPAÑÍA SUD AMERICANA DE VAPORES S.A. AND SUBSIDIARY**


## **QUARTERLY ANALYSIS**

Based on the Interim Consolidated Financial Statements  
as of March 31, 2025

# Q1 2025 AT A GLANCE

		As of March 31,		Change	
		2025	2024	%	#
Share of HLAG's net income	MMUS\$	<b>137.3</b>	93.8	46%	43
Net Income	MMUS\$	<b>149.4</b>	-159.1	(194%)	308

		As of March 31,		Change	
		2025	2024	%	#
Revenue	MMUS\$	<b>5,318</b>	4,623	15%	695
EBITDA	MMUS\$	<b>1,103</b>	942	17%	161
EBIT	MMUS\$	<b>487</b>	394	24%	93
Net Income	MMUS\$	<b>469</b>	323	45%	146
Freight rate	US\$/TEU	<b>1,480</b>	1,359	9%	121
Transport volume	MTEU	<b>3,305</b>	3,037	9%	268
Fuel price	USD/t	<b>553</b>	597	(7%)	(44)



✉ The Company reported net income of MMUS\$149.4 for the first quarter of 2025, compared to a loss of MMUS\$159.1 in the first quarter of 2024 due to a larger tax expense because of dividends received from Germany. The Company's net income before tax reached MMUS\$156.9 in 1Q25 versus MMUS\$71.4 in 1Q24.

✉ CSAV's earnings are mainly explained by stronger results from Hapag-Lloyd (HLAG), where CSAV recognized a larger share of MMUS\$137.3 (MMUS\$93.8 for 1Q24).

✉ During 1Q25, no dividends were distributed from Germany to CSAV, unlike the net MMEUR 604 received in 1Q24. This latter flow impacted the 1Q24 tax expense.

⚡ In 1Q25, the container shipping market showed solid demand (+4.2%) and Hapag-Lloyd had +9% growth in volume, with the transpacific trade being one of the strongest.

⚡ For its part, HLAG's average freight rate increased 9% even though spot ocean freight rates trended

downward during the entire quarter (-45%). There are challenges in the company's cost structure, which have increased its cost per container by 5%. Nevertheless, HLAG's EBITDA was up +17% and net income rose by +45% to MMUS\$469 for 1Q25.

⚡ The Red Sea conflict (detours, increased need for ships and containers and logistical problems) continues. This period has been marked by high geopolitical uncertainty and tariffs imposed by various countries, making it very difficult to forecast the impact on both supply and demand for the industry.

⚡ The new Gemini Cooperation between Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk was launched in February 2025. To date, 95% of the vessels are already operating and with a high confidence level of 90% compared to 50-75% at its competitors.

⚡ In March 25, Hanseatic Global Terminals, Hapag-Lloyd's terminal subsidiary, announced the purchase of 60% of Terminal de L'Atlantique in Le Havre, France, one of the 10 most important ports in Europe, offering an excellent connection to Paris.

Hapag-Lloyd maintained the range for its 2025 earnings outlook:  
EBITDA between MMUS\$ 2,500 and MMUS\$ 4,000; EBIT between MMUS\$ 0 and  
MUS\$ 1,500.

(2024: EBITDA MMUS\$ 5,029; EBIT MMUS\$ 2,788) 1

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## 1. Financial Position Analysis

### a) Statement of Financial Position

The following table details the Company's main asset and liability accounts as of each period end:

ASSETS	As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024	Change	
	MM US\$	MM US\$	%	MM US\$
<b>Current assets</b>	<b>707.1</b>	<b>694.9</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>12.2</b>
Cash and cash equivalents	79.4	84.3	(5.7%)	(4.8)
Current tax assets	627.2	610.2	2.8%	17.0
Other	0.5	0.4	4.6%	0.0
<b>Non-current assets</b>	<b>6,965.9</b>	<b>6,810.6</b>	<b>2.3%</b>	<b>155.3</b>
Equity method investments	6,818.2	6,668.5	2.2%	149.6
Non-current tax assets	134.6	129.3	4.1%	5.3
Investment property and Other	13.1	12.8	2.6%	0.3
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>7,673.0</b>	<b>7,505.5</b>	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>167.5</b>

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY	As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024	Change	
	MM US\$	MM US\$	%	MM US\$
<b>Current liabilities</b>	<b>178.7</b>	<b>132.2</b>	<b>35.1%</b>	<b>46.5</b>
Commercial and others, current	11.9	11.8	1.4%	0.2
Other	166.7	120.4	38.4%	46.3
<b>Non-current liabilities</b>	<b>105.7</b>	<b>101.6</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>4.1</b>
Deferred tax liabilities	104.7	100.7	4.1%	4.1
Other	0.9	0.9	1.7%	0.0
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>284.3</b>	<b>233.8</b>	<b>21.6%</b>	<b>50.6</b>
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>7,388.7</b>	<b>7,271.7</b>	<b>1.6%</b>	<b>116.9</b>
<b>Total liabilities and equity</b>	<b>7,673.0</b>	<b>7,505.5</b>	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>167.5</b>

↑ **Total assets** increased by MMUS\$167.5 compared to December 31, 2024, mainly due to an increase of MMUS\$155.3 in **non-current assets** and a small increase of MMUS\$12 in current assets. These variations are analyzed below.

↑ The increase of MMUS\$12.2 in **current assets** is explained mainly by a higher current tax balance of MMUS\$17.0, offset by a decrease in cash of MMUS\$4.8. Current recoverable income taxes increased by MMUS\$18.8 due to the EUR/US\$ translation effect, partially offset by lower credits for taxes paid abroad (MMUS\$1.9). Meanwhile, cash decreased due to operational payments.

Current Tax Assets MMUS\$	as of March 31st 2025	as of December 31st 2024	Change
Remaining VAT tax credit	2.2	2.0	10% 0.2
Income tax to recover	401.4	382.7	5% 18.8
Credits for taxes paid abroad	223.6	225.5	(1%) (1.9)
<b>Total current tax assets</b>	<b>627.2</b>	<b>610.2</b>	<b>3% 17.0</b>

Non-Current Tax Assets MMUS\$	as of March 31st 2025	as of December 31st 2024	Change
Income tax to recover	134.6	129.3	4% 5.3
<b>Total non-current tax assets</b>	<b>134.6</b>	<b>129.3</b>	<b>4% 5.3</b>

(Further details can be found in Note 17 to these Interim Consolidated Financial Statements).

The current retention balance is as follows:

Entity Paying Dividend	Payment Date	Dividend [MMEUR]	Retention Rate [%]	Retention [MMEUR]	Entity Receiving Retention
CSAV Germany	May 8, 2023	1,732	10.55%	183	CSAV Chile
CSAV Germany	August 8, 2023	480	10.55%	51	CSAV Chile
Hapag-Lloyd	May 6, 2024	488	26.375%	129	CSAV Germany
<b>Current tax assets</b>				<b>363</b>	
CSAV Germany	March 21, 2024	820	10.55%	87	CSAV Chile
CSAV Germany	May 7, 2024	360	10.55%	38	CSAV Chile
<b>Non-current tax assets</b>				<b>125</b>	
<b>Total</b>				<b>487*</b>	





Note: (\*) EUR/USD exchange rate fluctuations will not be hedged with financial instruments.

↑ **Non-current assets** increased by MMUS\$155.3. This increase is explained by its share of Hapag-Lloyd's earnings for the period (+MMUS\$149.6) and, to a lesser extent, by the increase in non-current tax assets consisting of the foreign retentions detailed in the table above (+MMUS\$5.3), which increased because of the EUR/US\$ translation effect.

CSAV Germany's stake in HLAG remained unchanged at 30% during the period.



Account Movements Equity Method Investments	MMUS\$
<b>Balance as of January 1, 2025</b>	<b>6,668.5</b>
HLAG Results	137.3
Share of other comprehensive income (loss)	12.4
Dividends Received	0.0
Other movements in equity	(0.0)
<b>Total Movements during the period</b>	<b>149.6</b>
<b>Balance as of March 31, 2025</b>	<b>6,818.2</b>

-  As of March 31, 2025, **total liabilities** increased by MMUS\$50.6 to MMUS\$284.3. This variation is mainly explained by increases in **current liabilities** of MMUS\$46.5 and **non-current liabilities** of MMUS\$4.1.
-  **Current liabilities** increased by MMUS\$46.5 largely explained by the minimum mandatory dividend provision of 30% of net income for the first quarter, plus the amount not yet paid as of year-end 2024.
-  On the other hand, **non-current liabilities** increased by MMUS\$4.1 compared to the same period of the previous year, mainly due to a larger deferred tax liability of MMUS\$4.1. This was generated by deferred income from retentions to be recovered from abroad, which are not expected to arrive within the year. It should be noted that the Company no longer has any financial debt.
-  As of March 31, 2025, **equity** increased by MMUS\$116.9 compared to December 31, 2024. This variation is mainly explained by net income for the year of MMUS\$149.4 and an increase in other comprehensive income (MMUS\$12.4), partially offset by a decrease in the 30% minimum mandatory dividend provision of MMUS\$44.8.

## b) Income Statement

Income Statement	As of March 31,		Change	
	2025	2024	%	
	MM US\$	MM US\$	%	MM US\$
Administrative and other operating expenses	(3.3)	(2.9)	12%	(0.4)
Other operating income	0.1	(0.0)	(410%)	0.1
<b>Operating Income (Loss)</b>	<b>(3.2)</b>	<b>(3.0)</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>
Finance costs, net	0.7	4.7	(85%)	(4.0)
Share of net income (loss) of associates and joint ventures	137.3	93.8	46%	43.5
Exchange rate differences and other non-operational	22.2	(24.1)	(192%)	46.3
Income tax expense	(7.5)	(230.5)	(97%)	223.0
<b>Net income for the year</b>	<b>149.4</b>	<b>(159.1)</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>130.2</b>

↑ For the period ended March 31, 2025, **net income attributable to the owners of the company** was MMUS\$149.4, which compares favorably with the loss of MMUS\$159.1 in 2024.

↑ **Administrative expenses** amounted to MMUS\$3.3 during the year (increase of MMUS\$0.4).

↑ **Other operating income** varied only slightly (MMUS\$0.1).

↓ CSAV had **net finance income** for the period of MMUS\$0.7, compared to greater net finance income of MMUS\$4.7 for the same period in 2024. This is mainly explained by less invested cash.

↑ Regarding the Company's **share of net income (loss) of associates and joint ventures**, CSAV recognized net income of MMUS\$137.3, greater than the MMUS\$93.8 recorded for the same period last year. This is mainly explained by higher sales at HLAG due to both a better average freight rate (+9%) and higher volumes (+9%), which was reflected in better earnings. More details in Section 2. Hapag-Lloyd's Financial Report as of March 31, 2025.

↑ There was also a positive **exchange difference** during the period of MMUS\$22.2, mainly due to the EUR/USD exchange rate associated with retentions to be recovered from Germany denominated in EUR. The Company no longer hedges these accounts because there is no certain date for the refund of the retained amount and a significant fluctuation of the euro against the dollar could lead to a cash mismatch.

↓ The **income tax expense** for the period was MMUS\$7.5, a decrease of MMUS\$230.5 compared to the same period last year. The tax expense is mainly explained by income taxes in Chile on dividends received from abroad by CSAV Germany. During the first quarter of 2025, no flows were received from Germany and net dividends of MMEUR 604 were received in the first quarter of 2024 in Chile.



### c) Analysis of Statement of Cash Flows

The main variations in cash flows are explained as follows.

Statements of Cash Flow	As of March 31,		Change	
	2025	2024		
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the period	84.3	278.3	(69.7%)	(194.0)
Cash flows from operating activities	(6.6)	(270.8)	(98%)	264.2
Payments from operating activities	(3.5)	(4.6)	(23%)	1.0
Income taxes and other	(3.0)	(266.2)	(99%)	263.2
Cash flows from investing activities	0.7	956.4	(100%)	(955.7)
Interest received and other	0.7	4.7	(84%)	(3.9)
Other	0.0	951.7	(100%)	(951.7)
Cash flows from financing activities	(0.1)	(0.1)	3%	(0.0)
Interest paid and other payments	(0.1)	(0.1)	3%	(0.0)
Exchange rate effect	1.1	(0.7)	(261%)	1.8
Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents	(4.8)	684.8	(101%)	(689.7)
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period	79.4	963.1	(92%)	(883.7)



The net change in cash and cash equivalents between January 1, 2025, and March 31, 2025, was a negative MMUS\$4.8.



Cash flows from operating activities were a negative MMUS\$6.6 in the period, which represents a larger outflow of MMUS\$264.2 compared to the previous year, mainly explained by operational payments to suppliers and employees and monthly tax payments in Germany. The previous year's flow is explained by taxes paid abroad on recovered retentions.



Cash flows from investing activities were a positive MMUS\$0.7 for the period, which represents a decrease of MMUS\$955.7 over last year. The flow for this period is basically explained by interest received. The flow in 2024 is related to recovered retentions from abroad.



Cash flows from financing activities were slightly negative by MMUS\$0.1, similar to the comparison period. This disbursement is related to the corporate office lease.



#### d) Financial Ratios

As of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, the main financial indicators are as follows:

##### i. Liquidity Ratios

Liquidity Ratios		As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024
Current Liquidity Ratio	= $\frac{\text{Current Assets}}{\text{Current Liabilities}}$	3.958	5.256



**Current Liquidity:** This ratio decreased to 3.9. This is explained by current assets (MMUS\$12.2/2% chg.) increasing more than current liabilities (MMUS\$46.5/35% chg.).

##### ii. Leverage Ratios

Indebtedness Ratios		As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024
Leverage	= $\frac{\text{Total Liabilities}}{\text{Equity}}$	3.8%	3.2%
Short-Term Leverage	= $\frac{\text{Current Liabilities}}{\text{Total Liabilities}}$	62.8%	56.6%
Long-Term Leverage	= $\frac{\text{Non-Current Liabilities}}{\text{Total Liabilities}}$	37.2%	43.4%



⊠ **Leverage:** This ratio, which is already at very low values, increased slightly compared to December 2024 because liabilities increased (MMUS\$50.6 / 22% chg.) but equity increased by a smaller percentage (MMUS\$50.6 / 2% chg.).



⊠ **Short-term Leverage:** This indicator increased with respect to December 2024, because the increase in current liabilities (MMUS\$46.5 / 35% chg.) was proportionally larger than the increase in total liabilities (MMUS\$50.6 / 22% chg.), as explained in section 1a) of this report.




⊠ **Long-term Leverage:** In contrast to the previous ratio, this indicator decreased with respect to December 2024, because the increase in non-current liabilities (MMUS\$4.1 / 4% chg.) is proportionally smaller than the rise in total liabilities (MMUS\$50.6 / 22% chg.), both of which are explained in section 1a) of this report.

## iii. Profitability Ratios


Profitability Ratios			As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024
Return on Equity	=	<u>Net Income Attributable to Owners of the Company</u> Average Equity	9.1%	5.1%
Return on Assets	=	<u>Net Income Attributable to Owners of the Company</u> Average Assets	8.8%	4.9%
Dividend Yield		<u>Dividends Paid in the last 12 Months</u> Market Capitalization at the end of the period	41.0%	41.5%
Earnings per Share	=	<u>Net Income Attributable to Owners of the Company</u> Number of Shares	0.014	0.008
Market Value of Stock(in chilean pesos)			52.0	53.7

\*Closing observed exchange rate of US\$ 996,4668 in Dec24, 877.12 in Dec23 and US\$ 953.07 in Mar25




 **Return on Equity:** This ratio improved with respect to December 2024, due to greater 12M net income attributable to the owners of the company of MMUS\$696.8 in comparison to net income of MMUS\$388.3 for 2024 (MMUS\$308.5 / 79% chg.). Average equity was also lower (-MMUS\$321.4 / -4%).




 **Return on Assets:** This ratio improved in relation to December 2024, due to an increase in net income attributable to the owners of the company (MMUS\$308.5, / 79% chg.) and almost no variation in average assets (MMUS\$7.0 / 0% chg.).




 **Dividend Yield:** This indicator held steady at 41% since no new dividends were distributed during the period and the market value of the share has not varied significantly (MMUS\$34.4 / 1.2% chg.).



 **Earnings per Share:** Earnings per share improved with respect to December 2024 because of better 12M results (MMUS\$308.5 / 79% chg.) (see first explanation). The total number of shares issued and subscribed did not vary.



 **Market Value of Stock:** The stock price as of March 31, 2025, fell by 3% compared to December 31, 2024.

## 2. Hapag-Lloyd's Quarterly Financial Report as of March 31, 2025

### i. Analysis of Key Hapag-Lloyd Figures

HLAG Key Figures		As of March 31,		Change	
		2025	2024	%	#
Total vessels		308	280	10%	28
Aggregate capacity of vessels	MTEU	2,421	2,066	17%	355
Aggregate container capacity	MTEU	3,719	3,065	21%	654
Freight rate (average for the period)	USD/TEU	1,480	1,359	9%	121
Transport volume	MTEU	3,305	3,037	9%	268
Revenue	MM USD	5,318	4,623	15%	695
Transport expenses	MM USD	3,756	3,286	14%	470
Bunker price (combined MFO / MDO, average for the period)	USD/t	32	25	28%	7
EBITDA	MM USD	553	597	(7%)	(44)
EBIT	MM USD	1,103	942	17%	161
Group profit / loss	MM USD	487	394	24%	93
Cash flow from operating activities (1)	MM USD	469	323	45%	146
<b>KPI</b>					
EBITDA margin (EBITDA / revenue)		20.7%	20.4%	0%	
EBIT margin (EBIT / revenue)		9.2%	8.5%	1%	
ROIC (NOPAT/IC) 2)		9.0%	8.2%	1%	

Hapag-Lloyd has significantly expanded its operating capacity. Comparing this quarter with the previous year, the number of vessels grew by 10% and vessel capacity by 17%, while its container fleet expanded by 21%. This increase in capacity has allowed for growth in transport volumes, which are up 9%, driven by all routes. The transpacific routes experienced the highest increase (+13.2%) followed by Asia-Europe (+12.6%), while the Atlantic route reported the lowest growth (+1.2%).

Freight rates also increased for all routes, rising by an average of 8.9% to an average price of US\$1,480/TEU. Meanwhile, costs are also on the rise. Cost per TEU increased 5% to US\$1,317/TEU, compared to the same period last year. Bunker and emissions expenses decreased by 5% due to a lower average bunker consumption price. However, the costs for CO<sub>2</sub> emission certificates had a partially offsetting effect.

Handling and haulage expenses were up 9%, due to higher storage costs for containers and increased expenses for inland transport. Equipment and repositioning expenses were similar to the previous year. Vessel and voyage expenses increased by 4%, mainly due to the increased share of vessels chartered on a mid-term basis and the associated operating expenses (non-lease components), container slot charter costs on third-party vessels and higher canal costs compared with the prior year period.

As a result of this rise in costs, Hapag-Lloyd announced a plan to cut costs by US\$1 billion over the next 18 months while also moving toward a cost of about US\$1,100/TEU by 2030.

The Terminal and Infrastructure segment reported similar figures for 1Q24 and 1Q25. EBITDA increased to MMUS\$35 (1Q24: MMUS\$36) and EBIT to MMUS\$16 (1Q24: MMUS\$15).

In short, despite higher costs, revenue increased more, bringing HLAG's EBIT to MMUS\$487 (1Q24: MMUS\$394), while the EBIT margin reached 9.2%, a positive figure in line with the 1Q24 figure of 8.5%.

For the quarter, HLAG's tax expense decreased by MMUS\$92 to MMUS\$7 in 1Q25 (1Q24 MMUS\$100). The lower tax expense is mainly explained by deferred taxes within the Hapag-Lloyd Group. While current taxes increased to MMUS\$47 in 1Q25 (1Q24: MMUS\$14), there was a significant increase in deferred tax income, reaching MMUS\$40 (1Q24 deferred tax expense MMUS\$86).

At the beginning of the year, the industry continued to be affected by the Red Sea conflict (detours, increased need for ships and containers and logistical problems). Furthermore, there has been high geopolitical uncertainty and tariffs imposed by various countries, making it very difficult to forecast the impact on both supply and demand for the industry. Hapag-Lloyd did not change its 2025 earnings expectation.

## ii. Hapag-Lloyd Balance Sheet and Liquidity Indicators

Balance sheet KPI		As of March 31, 2025	As of December 31, 2024	Change	
				%	#
Total Assets	MM USD	35,503	34,940	1.6%	563
Total Liabilities	MM USD	13,466	13,401	0.5%	65
Total Equity	MM USD	22,037	21,539	2.3%	498
Equity ratio (equity / balance sheet total)		62.1%	61.6%	0.8%	
<b>Debt</b>					
Financial debt	MM USD	6,979	6,868	2%	111
Cash and cash equivalents	MM USD	5,886	5,696	3%	190
Liquidity reserve	MM USD	1,015	946	7%	69

As for the balance sheet indicators, assets increased by MMUS\$563, mainly due to the increase (net of depreciation) in property, plant and equipment (investments in ships, equipment and containers, assets under construction and new chartered ships) and the rise in cash (+MMUS\$190). Liabilities increased slightly (+MMUS\$65) and equity climbed by MMUS\$498, mainly due to net income for the year (MMUS\$469).

The company's liquidity is positive (i.e., the cash balance is greater than outstanding debt), so the indicators are favorable. This calculation considers MMUS\$2,108 in other current financial assets invested in instruments maturing in over one year.


### 3. Market Analysis

The following section discusses the container shipping industry. CSAV has participated in this industry since 2014 through its investment in the German shipping company Hapag-Lloyd (accounted for as a joint venture using the equity method), in which it has a 30% stake as of March 31st.

#### i. Industry Growth Aligned with World GDP

Until just before the beginning of the container shipping industry's consolidation phase, operators employed a strategy focused on growth and increasing market share, which was driven by globalization, technological development and manufacturers relocating to emerging economies. In today's hyper-connected economy, the industry has achieved a greater degree of maturity and there is a direct relationship between international trading of goods—where container shipping is the main mode of transportation—and global GDP.

Thus, the industry's growth is well aligned with global growth, with some occasional decoupled events, especially during the COVID pandemic. In 2024, the industry expanded 6.0%. Over the next few years, growth projections for both overall GDP and the industry have been adjusted; in 2025 the industry is expected to grow 0.3% and GDP by 3.0%; and in 2026 both should increase by 3.0%.



Source: Clarksons Research Container Volume 2016-2026e (Apr-25); Global GDP - IMF (Apr-25)

## ii. Industry Consolidation in Search of Efficiencies

Even though the container shipping industry still boasts a large number of players, especially in the segment of smaller-sized companies, growing industry consolidation has been seen in the past few years.

The major wave of mergers and acquisitions began with the combination of CSAV and HLAG's container shipping businesses in 2014. This combined entity then merged with the Arabian shipping line UASC in May 2017. Since then, HLAG has ranked among the world's top five shipping lines by hauling capacity.

Other important deals include the acquisition of the Chilean shipping line CCNI by German company Hamburg Süd and the subsequent purchase of Hamburg Süd by the Danish firm Maersk. This transaction was completed in November 2017, although they continue to operate under separate structures. In addition, to complete this acquisition Maersk had to dispose of its cabotage business in Brazil due to its high concentration in this business. That division was sold to CMA CGM, the French shipping line that had previously purchased the Japanese company APL.

The main Asian shipping companies also engaged in important mergers and acquisitions. In 2016 China Shipping merged with another Chinese firm, COSCO, which was subsequently acquired by Hong Kong's Orient Overseas Container Lines (OOCL) in July 2018. Furthermore, an association to merge the three largest Japanese lines (K-Line, NYK and MOL) into one entity was announced and began to operate jointly under the name Ocean Network Express (ONE) in 2018. However, despite completing the acquisition of OOCL and initiating operations at ONE, these companies are still independent entities and have not yet harnessed the potential synergies of full integration. This demonstrates how the large size of the shipping companies involved in these transactions lends greater complexity, higher costs and reduced efficiencies to such processes, generating a decreasing return from the benefits obtained from greater operating scales.


Another relevant development in this consolidation process was the bankruptcy and closure of operations by Hanjin Shipping in 2016. At that time, the Korean company was the seventh-largest container shipping company (based on hauling capacity). This is the largest bankruptcy case in the history of the container shipping industry.

Following all these business combinations and Hanjin's bankruptcy, currently the ten largest global shipping operators account for almost 85% of installed capacity, while the five largest have close to 65%.

Likewise, in recent years joint operating agreements and operating alliances have expanded in order to improve customer service levels and broaden geographic coverage, while generating very significant economies of scale and network economies.

There have been recent changes in these alliances, with the following new agreement structure initiating in February 2025: MSC currently operates independently, however, it will join Zim along Transpacific trades and Premier Alliance in Asia-Europe trades; Gemini Cooperation between Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk; Premier Alliance composed of Yang Ming, ONE and HMM; and finally the unmodified Ocean Alliance will continue with CMA-CGM, COSCO and Evergreen.

### iii. Ship Supply Indicators



Source: Clarksons Research (May-25)

In the 2000s, the global economy and demand for containers grew sharply (before the subprime crisis), which drove shipbuilding orders up. Between 2005 and 2008, the global orderbook to total fleet ratio averaged around 55%. Then the industry faced a financial crisis in 2008, which led to significant oversupply in the shipping market. In subsequent years, the industry managed to significantly decrease oversupply, which reached historically low orders of 8.4% in October 2020.

Today, the upward trend in orders is due to the need for fleet renewal. This will also help liners comply with new regulatory and environmental measures requiring them to, among other things, reduce their speed, which affects available supply. A considerable portion of the new orders will be delivered towards the end of the decade (2028-2030).

Growth in supply in upcoming years can be calculated by, on one hand, the total shipping capacity of the orderbook with respect to the total fleet, which represents the capacity that will be incorporated into the operative fleet within the next 24 to 30 months (the average construction and delivery time for vessels) and, on the other hand, the shipping capacity scrapped each year and, thus, no longer operating.

In terms of fleet renewal, for a vessel with a useful life of 25 years, a normalized scrapping rate of about 4% per year can be expected. Lately, however, scrapping has remained low with yearly average scrapping of 0.5% for the past five years.

Hapag-Lloyd (as well as the industry) has increased its hauling capacity in recent years through either new vessel orders, purchases of vessels from third parties or charters. In 2024 its fleet



expanded by 19% to 2.3 million TEUs (2.4 million TEUs today). Four 23,660 TEU vessels (of 12 ordered) are expected to be incorporated in 2025, of which two have already been delivered.

The company's most recent order was announced in November 2024, when it signed two contracts with two Chinese shipyards for a total of 24 new container ships. Twelve of these new vessels, each with a capacity of 16,800 TEU, will be built by Yangzijiang Shipbuilding Group. These units will be used to expand the capacity of existing services. The second contract was awarded to New Times Shipbuilding Company Ltd., also for twelve vessels (each with a capacity of 9,200 TEU), which will replace older units in Hapag-Lloyd's fleet that will reach the end of their useful life during the decade.

All these new vessels will be equipped with state-of-the-art, low-emission, LNG-fueled, dual-propulsion, extremely fuel-efficient engines. In addition, they can also be powered by biomethane, which can reduce CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions by up to 95% compared to conventional propulsion systems, and will be ammonia-ready. They are scheduled for delivery between 2027 and 2029, adding a combined capacity of 312,000 TEU with a total investment of about US\$4 billion.


Thus, the new orders total 407,000 TEUs, or 17% of the company's fleet, lower than the industry average (30%). This is in addition to seven other 8,253 TEU vessels under construction that will be chartered after delivery in 2026/2027. Including these charters, its orderbook rises to 19%.

Hapag-Lloyd has continued to expand its investments in the port terminals sector after purchases of several terminals in 2023: SAAM Terminals, which has investments in 10 terminals in the Americas and is based in Chile, Spinelli Group in Italy and JM Baxi in India. In addition, Hapag-Lloyd has stakes in JadeWeserPort in Wilhelmshaven, the Altenwerder container terminal in Hamburg, terminal TC3 in Tangier and terminal 2 in Damietta, which is currently under construction.

In March 2025, Hanseatic Global Terminals, Hapag-Lloyd's terminal subsidiary, announced that it was acquiring 60% of CNMP LH. The container terminal, Terminal de L'Atlantique, in Le Havre, France, is one of the 10 most important ports in Europe, handling 3 million containers annually and offering an excellent connection to Paris.

#### iv. Effective Fleet Management Maintained Supply-Demand Equilibrium

In addition to the industry's gross growth (new vessel construction plus fleet renewal), one must consider the different initiatives adopted individually by shipping lines or collectively through operating alliances to maintain suitable vessel deployment levels within the network, regardless of short-term fluctuations in demand. Keeping vessel deployment levels stable is key to the integrity and sustainability of the quality of services provided to customers, as well as to maintaining the cost efficiencies generated by this operating scale.



NOTE:


<sup>1</sup> Until mid-November 2021 the "unemployed" fleet included vessels undergoing extraordinary repairs or being retrofit, but excluded ships that were idle for routine repairs. Since then, the "unemployed" fleet includes only those considered "commercially inactive" (excess capacity in the market or in the operator's fleet).

Source: Alphaliner Monthly Monitor (Apr-25)

The idle fleet indicator is sensitive to management variables and supply-demand equilibrium. Last year, the idle fleet remained at low levels, partly because a large part of the chartered fleet is contracted for the medium term and partly because last year's detours through Africa due to geopolitical conflicts have generated a need for a larger fleet. The idle fleet is at 0.6% today. In addition, if the fleet under repair is considered, this indicator reaches 2.8%.

#### v. Fuel: The Industry's Main Consumable

Fuel is one of the most important inputs in the shipping industry and has a major impact on operating costs. The price of fuel is commonly indexed to freight rates in customer contracts for shipping services.




Source: Clarksons Research (May-25)

Since 2016, a moderate but continuous increase in the price of fuel has been observed, maintaining constant pressure on operating costs and on shipping rates considered at equilibrium. This is partly

explained by the heightened frequency and duration of various geopolitical conflicts in countries such as: Russia, Ukraine, Israel and Palestine. However, this year there is a slight downward trend.

In 2020, the new sulfide air emissions regulation for the shipping industry, “IMO 2020,” took effect. Starting January 1, 2020, it mandates worldwide use of fuel with a maximum sulfur content of 0.5% (known as very low sulfur fuel oil or VLSFO), far below the 3.5% sulfur content of fuels previously used on long ocean voyages.

The IMO2020 standard gives shipping lines the option of powering vessels with more refined, more expensive fuel; retrofitting them with scrubbers that enable them to use high-sulfur fuel; or seeking new fuel alternatives such as LNG, which led to changes in infrastructure. For example, 42% of the total fleet of container ships has been fully retrofit, while other alternatives such as GNL continue to account for 6% of the current fleet.



Source: Alphaliner Monthly Monitor Apr-25

New orders are comprised of 5% conventional vessels, 14% ships with scrubbers, 57% vessels that can run on LNG (or dual) and 24% methanol-powered ships. These changes in the orderbook respond to an industry undergoing a decarbonization process and searching for cleaner alternative fuels.

Additionally, a new environmental measure "IMO2023" came into force in 2023, which seeks to gradually reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from commercial vessels. Under this regulation, each vessel must measure its Energy Efficiency eXisting ship Index (EEXI) and Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII). Based on these indicators, vessels will be categorized by efficiency and will be required to take corrective measures to continue operating.


Additionally, in the European Union (EU) the shipping industry has been included in the carbon credit market. This means that ships must measure their emissions, which will be accounted for at

100% if the route is between two EU ports or 50% if it is between one EU port and one non-EU. In 2024, 40% of emissions were offset. The target for 2025 is 70% and then 100% in 2026.

In view of these environmental changes, Hapag-Lloyd has taken various measures to reduce its emissions, including new acquisitions with LNG-powered or LNG-ready engines, helping reduce emissions by around 25%. The November 2024 order is for dual propulsion (LNG and ammonia ready) vessels. The company also started a methanol conversion pilot plan together with Seaspan, and has continued and expanded the use of biofuels. It started pilot tests with this fuel in 2020 and began blending it with normal bunker at the end of 2022 on 24 ships, with the possibility of expanding to more ships in the future. Biofuel, which is mainly generated from reused (household) cooking oils, produces 80% less emissions than normal bunker.

In addition, Hapag-Lloyd is moving forward with its Fleet Re-optimization Program. This is a 5-year plan to upgrade 150 ships by changing propellers, upgrading to more hydrodynamic hulls and improving hull paints to minimize frictional resistance and thus reduce their carbon footprint. This plan is expected to reduce fuel consumption by 6-7%, in addition to increasing the cargo capacity of the ships.

#### vi. Fluctuations in Demand




Source: Clarksons Research (Apr-25)

The global economy, and the container shipping industry in particular, was shaped over the past years by the COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2020, the industry suffered a sharp contraction in worldwide demand followed by an abrupt recovery. Then inventory readjustments and a slower market were seen in 2022 and 2023.

In 2024, demand was again dynamic with 6% growth in TEUs and 17% in TEU/mile. The latter figure is explained by the greater distances traveled to detour around the Cape of Good Hope. In 2025, demand has grown by an average of 4.4%, well above expectations for the year (0.3%), a reflection of the high uncertainty caused by the tariffs announced by the major world powers.

The Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI) is an indicator of weekly trends in closing spot freight rates (shipments not subject to contracts with shipping lines). The graph shows the downward trend since mid-2022. This drop is mainly explained by less congested logistics due to lower demand, normalizing inventories and the commissioning of new ships during 2022.



Source: Clarksons Research (Mar-25) Shanghai Containerized Freight Index.

In 2023, the SCFI remained at relatively stable levels of around US\$1,000/TEU. However, conflicts began in the Red Sea towards the end of the year, which led to a rebound in spot rates as seen in the graph. In short, following the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, a pro-Palestinian Yemeni group, the Houthis, began attacking ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This prompted the main shipping lines to avoid or reduce voyages in the area, preferring a longer route via the Cape of Good Hope. This led to an increase in spot rates, which have remained higher than figures seen in 2023. In 2024 the spot rate averaged US\$2,506/TEU, and so far in 2025 it has fallen by 46%, averaging US\$1,630/TEU for the year.

#### 4. Market Risk Analysis

As described in Note 5 of the Interim Consolidated Financial Statements as of March 31, 2025, CSAV's investment in Hapag-Lloyd represents 88.86% of its total consolidated assets.

Its investment in Hapag-Lloyd, the container shipping business, is CSAV's main asset. Though it is not directly exposed to the risks facing the container shipping industry, it is indirectly exposed. These risks directly impact the value of CSAV's investment in the joint venture, the flow of dividends from Hapag-Lloyd and its capital requirements.

The risks arising from the container transport business—operated entirely by Hapag-Lloyd—are managed autonomously by the joint venture's management and according to standards applicable to publicly traded, regulated corporations in Germany.

Considering the above, the risks to which CSAV is exposed can be classified into: (a) Business Risk, (b) Credit Risk, (c) Liquidity Risk and (d) Market Risk.

##### a) Business Risk

The main business risks for CSAV are those related to (i) the balance of supply and demand for maritime transport, (ii) risks associated with its main geographical markets and (iii) fuel prices.

**i) Supply-Demand Equilibrium:** The demand for maritime transport is highly correlated with growth of global GDP and trade. On the other hand, container shipping supply is a function of the global fleet of vessels, which fluctuates based on the delivery of new vessels and the scrapping of vessels that are obsolete or no longer profitable to operate. Therefore, equilibrium in the container transport business, operated and managed by HLAG, is directly affected by changes in these variables.

The imbalance between supply and demand can affect shipping operators to a greater or lesser extent depending on their operating fleet (vessel age, fuel consumption and versatility, among other characteristics), the proportion of their fleet that is owned and the proportion chartered (operational leverage) in comparison to the industry. Significant exposure to chartered vessels can negatively impact the results and the financial position of operators when charter rates are not correlated with freight rates before fuel costs (ex-bunker rates), either because of market imbalances or the duration of vessel charter agreements at fixed rates.

The duration and age of charter agreements can limit shipping companies' capacity to match their operated fleets and change their vessel sailing speed, in response to abrupt drops in shipping demand, or streamlining and cost-cutting initiatives.

HLAG continuously evaluates market conditions to identify threats or extraordinary risks and implement suitable measures to mitigate possible negative impacts. A clear example of this is multiple measures

adopted in early 2020 in response to the spread of the coronavirus. HLAG formed a Central Crisis Committee in charge of executing an Operational Continuity Plan, whose objective was to safeguard employee safety and health while keeping the company up and running. In 2024, in response to operational disruptions caused by the conflict in the Red Sea, which involved ship detours and an increased need for fleet and containers, HLAG also took all necessary measures to minimize and control the risks associated with the business.

**ii) Geographical Markets:** The HLAG joint venture participates in container shipping across all major global routes, and it distributes its operations across diverse geographical markets, providing liner services in more than 137 countries. As a result of its geographic diversification, the Company is not particularly exposed to any given geographical market and can thus offset possible market contingencies on certain routes. However, it is still exposed to global variations. Even with a global service network, HLAG's relative exposure is above the industry average on Transatlantic, Latin American and Middle East routes and below average on Transpacific and Intra-Asia routes. As a result of the May 2017 merger of HLAG and UASC, HLAG incorporated UASC's service network and its important cargo volumes along Asia-Europe and Middle East routes and, therefore, its relative exposure to the main global routes became more balanced.

Thus, HLAG is less exposed to geopolitical risks that can significantly impact specific trades, such as certain armed conflicts currently underway. The reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023 led a Yemeni group called the Houthis to start attacking ships passing through the Red Sea at the end of that year, forcing the main shipping lines to reroute their traffic via the Cape of Good Hope to protect their crews and vessels. The implications of this measure have been seen since early 2024, resulting in higher operating costs due to the increased deployment of fleets and containers, in addition to repositioning and additional transshipments to ensure normality and frequency along the route.

**iii) Fuel Prices:** An important component of the transport industry's cost structure is the cost of energy, or fuel, which is usually called "bunker" within the maritime shipping industry.

Due to fluctuations in fuel prices, a significant proportion of maritime freight sales are agreed with contracts and a percentage of those rates are subject to price adjustments, based on changes in bunker costs.

In order to reduce the impact of potential upward volatility in bunker prices on sales and contracts that have such a clause but only with limited coverage, or that are at a fixed price, HLAG takes out fuel price hedges on unhedged volumes, although the use of this tool is more limited.

## b) Credit Risk

Since the Company has no direct customers, its credit risk is derived from exposure to counterparty risk in the case of financial assets or derivatives maintained with banks or other institutions.



The Company's policy for managing its financial assets (current accounts, time deposits, repo agreements, derivative contracts, etc.) is to maintain these assets at financial institutions with “investment grade” risk ratings.

c)      Liquidity Risk

Liquidity risk refers to the Company's exposure to business or market factors that may affect its ability to generate income and cash flows, including the effect of contingencies and regulatory requirements associated with its business.

CSAV is not directly exposed to the container business, as explained in this note, but indirectly as one of the main shareholders of HLAG. This limits the Company's liquidity risk in that business to the expected flow of dividends or any additional capital required by this joint venture.

d)      Market Risk

Market risk is the risk that the value of the Company's assets or liabilities continuously and permanently fluctuates over time as the result of a change in key economic variables such as: (i) interest rates and (ii) exchange rates.

**i) Interest Rate Fluctuations:** Interest rate fluctuations impact the Company's floating rate obligations. There is currently no exposure, since the Company has no financial debt.

**ii) Exchange rate fluctuations:** The Company's functional currency is the US dollar, which is the currency in which most of its operating income and expenses are denominated as well as the currency used by most of the global shipping industry and the functional currency of HLAG. However, the Company also has flows in other currencies, such as Chilean pesos, euros and other minor currencies.

When necessary, the Company can use accounting hedges to mitigate changes in these variables. Variations in the market price of these hedges, in accordance with current policy, are recorded in other comprehensive income.

The Company has no exchange hedge for the taxes to be recovered from Germany, denominated in euros and capitalized as current in the balance sheet, because there is no certain date for the refund of the retained amount and a significant fluctuation of the euro against the dollar could lead to a cash mismatch.



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